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1.  Introduction 
 
Terrorists perpetrate violence to draw public attention to their objectives, and to pressurize ruling 
political dispensations into capitulating to their demands. Just as governments of different 
countries may coalesce to combat terrorism, terrorist groups may join forces to overwhelm the 
State machinery.1 For instance, consider the merger in 2012 of the Somali terrorist group al-
Shabaab, with the al Qaeda.2 Alliances between terrorist groups however, are an exception rather 
than the rule, given that less than one percent (417 to be exact) of the 81,799 terror attacks 
conducted during 1970-2007 involved more than one terror outfit (Asal et al., 2016). This may 
be due to the inability of terror outfits, which are illegal organizations, to credibly overcome 
commitment issues in the absence of third-party enforcement (Bacon, 2017).3 Further, a 
significant fraction of outfits does not exist for more than a year, thereby making it difficult for 
them to reliably pledge to certain behavioral patterns for the long term.4 
  
In fact, a prominent reason proposed in the literature for inter-outfit cooperation, is the 
resultant enhancement of outfit longevity. Using data spanning 1987 to 2005, Phillips (2014) 
shows that terror outfits having one ally are 38 percent less likely to discontinue in a given year, 
compared to terror outfits without any ally. Further, the ability of terror outfits to address each 
other’s organizational voids, forge a common discernibility and cultivate mutual trust are 
ubiquitous prerequisites for intergroup alliances (Bacon, 2018a). The notion that alliances are a 
measure of vulnerability, however, is not empirically validated.5 On the other hand, Phillips 
(2019) finds that “alliances are associated with territorial control, intermediate membership 
size, and religious motivation”. 
  
                                                          
1
 See Sandler (2005) for a discussion on coordination problems which plague international cooperation against 
transnational terrorism, but do not hinder resolute effort against domestic terrorism; and Perliger and Milton (2018) 
for a data-driven identification of conditions under which countries may engage in counter-terrorism cooperation. 
2
 See Thomas (2013) for a discussion on the counter-terrorism opportunities arising from vulnerabilities created as a 
result of this amalgamation. 
3
 See Choi, Chowdhury and Kim (2016) for an insightful discussion on inter-group and intra-group dynamics, and 
possible feedback effects of inter-outfit rivalries. These can potentially negate any attempts at cooperation. 
4
 Phillips (2019), based on eight most extensive global datasets on the longevity of terror outfits, obtains that 25-74 
percent of outfits do not last beyond a year. 
5
 See Phillips (2019), for instance. 
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In addition to understanding the causes of inter-group terrorist cooperation, it is also 
important to dwell on the nature of cooperation between terror outfits. Significant variation is 
observed in the scope and depth of cooperation between different terror outfits, from mergers 
and strategic cooperation at the upper end of the scale, to tactical and transactional cooperation at 
the lower end (Moghadam, 2015). In fact, mergers and strategic cooperation become equivalent 
if payoffs are freely transferable between the outfits, under the latter regime. When outfits 
merge, each outfit sacrifices its individual identity. Under transactional cooperation, at the other 
end of the spectrum, there is usually no noteworthy loss of independence for either outfit. Hence, 
the quality of cooperation holds salience for each outfit, and thereby for those seeking to counter 
them. 
  
The present work is the first to formally model inter-outfit strategic cooperation in a 
manner which reveals that the cooperating outfits may conduct more, less or the same number of 
attacks as in the absence of cooperation; based on whether they are resource-constrained or not a 
priori; and on the extent to which cooperation can serve to ease such a constraint through inter-
outfit resource-transfer. The alleged provision of training facilities by the Hezbollah in southern 
Lebanon, for thousands of Hamas fighters, is a case in point.6 Bacon (2018b) discusses how 
cooperation between the al Qaeda and the Taliban, provided the former with a safe haven in 
Afghanistan, while benefitting the latter in terms of superior training of its fighters by al Qaeda 
operatives. She points out that al Qaeda operatives have, in fact, been known to carry out special 
operations on Taliban’s behalf. Bacon (2018b) also mentions how it was the al Qaeda, during the 
1990s, which provided funds to the Taliban. This typifies successful cooperation spanning over 
two decades, in which resources have been transferred in both directions during different periods 
of time, based on changing circumstances and evolving requirements. Also consider the alliance 
with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), initiated by Fusako Shigenobu of 
the Japanese Red Army, in 1971. The cooperation, driven by resource requirements needed to 
implement its chosen strategy, resulted in the provision of guerilla training facilities to Red 
Army members, by PFLP operatives in Lebanon (Steinhoff, 1976; Bacon 2018a). 
 
                                                          
6
 See “Israel says Hamas working with Hezbollah to train ‘thousands’ in Lebanon”, in Times of Israel (9 June, 
2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-says-hamas-working-with-hezbollah-to-train-thousands-in-lebanon/. 
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Based on Bhan and Kabiraj (2020), our structure is able to illustrate clearly the 
distinction – if present - between the equilibria in the presence and absence of strategic 
cooperation, under different parametric restrictions. Further, the formulation demonstrates a 
natural barrier to the excessive use of any outfit channel for conducting attacks under 
cooperation, based on the diseconomies of scale associated with terror activity. This shows why 
such cost-convexities, by themselves, may provide a strong rationale for inter-outfit cooperation 
by providing the co-operating outfits multiple channels of terror activity. 
 
Other benefits from strategic cooperation may flow from the internalization of 
operational externalities imposed by the activities of one group on the other, such as those 
discussed and modeled in Bhan and Kabiraj (2019). As a consequence of such cooperation, the 
total number of attacks conducted by the terrorists would tend to increase under positive 
externalities, and decrease under negative externalities. The present analysis, on the other hand, 
rationalizes strategic cooperation even in the absence of externalities, thereby indicating the 
possibility of inter-outfit cooperation in a wider range of real-world situations. 
 
Refer to the afore-mentioned example of cooperation between the Japanese Red Army 
and the PFLP, the former originating in the East Asian country of Japan, and the latter operating 
in West Asia. Despite the traditional theatres of operation of these outfits being separated by 
thousands of kilometers of land and sea, their alliance led to the deadly attack conducted by Red 
Army terrorists on Lod Airport near the Israeli city of Tel Aviv in 1972, resulting in 28 deaths 
(including two attackers) and nearly 80 injuries (including the third attacker), thereby 
highlighting the potential for deadly cooperation between outfits imposing no operational 
externalities on each other a priori. 
 
Inter-outfit cooperation may also have grave consequences in terms of the lethality of 
terror outfits. For instance, consider the symbiotic relationship that emerged between the 
Southeast Asian outfit Jemaah Islamiyah and the al Qaeda, which enabled the training of the 
former’s manpower by the latter’s operatives, resulting in the deadly Bali bombing in 2002 
(Horowitz and Potter, 2014). Also, the then alleged and oft-ridiculed - and later proven - training 
of amateur Boko Haram personnel by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operatives 
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beginning in 2009, resulted in suicide attacks conducted by the former in 2011 on the United 
Nations office in Abuja, Nigeria, using tactics similar to bombings conducted by the latter 
(Aronson, 2014). These examples serve to illustrate how cooperation can serve to increase the 
killing capacity of the outfits involved. 
 
Finally, the circumstances associated with cooperation between symmetric and 
asymmetric entities, is critical in obtaining a holistic understanding of inter-group terrorist 
cooperation. Utilizing the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Bapat and Bond (2012) 
conclude that whereas outfits less at risk of State suppression tend to favour two-sided alliances, 
“vulnerable militants are more likely to form asymmetric alliances” such as those involving state 
or external sponsors. The present paper borrows from the formulation of Bhan and Kabiraj 
(2020) to illustrate not only the potential of strategic external sponsorship to augment violence, 
but also to demonstrate how strategic intergroup cooperation between terrorists can impede the 
effectiveness of such sponsorship, thereby decreasing the appeal for any potential sponsor to 
finance the cooperating outfits. This also provides a logical basis for a potential external sponsor, 
to hinder any inter-outfit strategic cooperation, in order to increase its own ability to induce 
additional terror attacks. 
 
Consider for instance, the impact of the emergence of al-Badr in the Indian State of 
Jammu and Kashmir, towards the close of the 20th century. Earlier operating under the banner of 
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Al-Badr was allegedly encouraged by Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) to operate independently in the year 1998, as mentioned in an ANI report 
(dated 23 August, 2017) titled ‘J-K: Al-Badr terrorist killed in Budgam encounter’.7 Since then, 
the combined number of terror strikes conducted by both outfits dramatically increased, although 
HM still accounted for an overwhelming majority of the attacks. From 0 incidents in 1996 and 
1997, the combined number of terror strikes jumped to 8 in 1999, 12 in 2000, and 11 in 2001. It 
is also noteworthy that Al-Badr was involved in only 1 terror incident (in 1999) out of the 
combined 31 in the period 1999-2001 (Global Terrorism Database). Hence, by engineering a 
split between HM and Al-Badr, the ISI was able to manipulate the former into conducting more 
attacks in order to maintain its (the HM’s) pre-eminence. 
                                                          
7
 See https://www.aninews.in/news/national/politics/j-k-al-badr-terrorist-killed-in-budgam-encounter/. 
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The present work also provides a theoretical foundation for strategic external 
sponsorship, by internalizing the decision of terror outfits to cooperate strategically or not, and 
the external finance offered. Based on the ex-ante resources with the outfits and the quantum of 
finance made available by the sponsor, situations are illustrated where strategic external 
sponsorship can optimally induce outfits to operate non-cooperatively, and conduct attacks at the 
behest of the strategic sponsor. 
 
Counter-terrorism (CT) implications of inter-group strategic cooperation must be viewed 
in light of the specificities of each instance in terms of ex ante resources with the outfits, 
availability of external sponsorship, etc., in order to determine whether such cooperation would 
increase or decrease terror strikes. Circumstances encouraging cooperation must be created in the 
latter situation, while measures inhibiting cooperation must be pursued in the former. For 
example, if the presence of a potential external sponsor is likely to increase attacks by 
discouraging cooperation, then CT efforts must be directed at enabling and encouraging alliance-
formation, and thereby keeping the external sponsor at bay. Consider conversely, for instance, 
that cooperation is likely to ease the resource-constraint of an outfit such that overall violence is 
augmented. Then all efforts must be made to disrupt such an alliance by sowing distrust between 
the outfit leaders by raising suspicions of the potential partner being infiltrated by enemy 
intelligence, emphasizing ideological distinctions and operational autonomy, etc. via surveillance 
of inter-group communications and covert messaging for example, along the lines suggested by 
Bacon (2017). 
 
The next section presents the baseline model, utilizing it to characterize and compare the 
equilibria under cooperation and non-cooperation. The third section analyzes the impact of 
strategic cooperation in the presence of a potential external sponsor. The fourth section extends 
the analysis by endogenizing the outfits’ decision to cooperate or not, in the presence of strategic 
external sponsorship. Finally, the fifth section briefly discusses the implications of the results 
obtained, and concludes. 
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2.  Model 
 
Consider the interaction of two terror outfits, 𝑇1 and 𝑇2, operating in a target country. We assume 
that utility or payoff of 𝑇𝑖 comes from two sources: consumption (over and above the subsistence 
level) (𝑋𝑖), and the number of attacks it conducts (𝐴𝑖).8 Assume the utility function to be linear, 
specifically,9  𝑈𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝐴𝑖; 𝑖 = 1, 2                                            
where the parameter 𝛼𝑖  (≥ 0) represents intrinsic propensity of violence of 𝑇𝑖. The associated 
cost of conducting 𝐴𝑖 attacks for 𝑇𝑖 is 𝐶𝑖(𝐴𝑖) = 12 𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑖2                                 
where 𝛽𝑖 is a parameter representing cost-efficiency of terror outfit 𝑖, such that a higher 𝛽𝑖 
represents lower efficiency. The quadratic cost function reflects increasing difficulty in 
conducting successive attacks. Then, the budget constraint of  𝑇𝑖 is given by: 
 𝑋𝑖 + 12 𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑖2 = 𝑅𝑖                                                       
where 𝑅𝑖  (> 0) is the resource-endowment available to 𝑇𝑖, net of subsistence consumption. We 
first note the equilibrium outcomes when the outfits interact independently or non-cooperatively, 
that is, when each outfit maximizes its payoff subject to its budget constraint. Following Bhan 
and Kabiraj (2020), we have the following results.  
 
2.1 Non-cooperative (NC) equilibrium outcomes 
 
(NC1): When 𝑅𝑖 ≥ 12 𝛽𝑖 (𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖)2 holds for each 𝑖, that is, no outfit is resource constrained, we call 
this interior equilibrium. Then in equilibrium: 
 𝐴𝑖𝑁𝐶 = 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖,    and 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖 − 12 𝛼𝑖2𝛽𝑖 ≡ 𝑋𝑖𝑁𝐶 ≥ 0      ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2                             (1a)      
Hence, total number of attacks is:    𝐴𝑁𝐶 = 𝐴1𝑁𝐶 + 𝐴2𝑁𝐶 = 𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2                                                                        (1b) 
                                                          
8
 More generally, 𝐴𝑖 can be considered to be an index of terror activity. We assume 𝐴𝑖 to be a continuous variable. 
9
 The formulation is based on Bhan and Kabiraj (2020). 
8 
 
(NC2): When 𝑅1 ≥ 12 𝛽1 (𝛼1𝛽1)2 but 𝑅2 < 12 𝛽2 (𝛼2𝛽2)2, the equilibrium outcomes will be: 
 𝐴1𝑁𝐶 = 𝛼1𝛽1, 𝑋1𝑁𝐶 = 𝑅1 − 12 𝛼12𝛽1 ≥ 0 , but  𝐴2𝑁𝐶 = √2𝑅2𝛽2  and 𝑋2𝑁𝐶 = 0                       (2a) 
 𝐴𝑁𝐶 = 𝐴1𝑁𝐶 + 𝐴2𝑁𝐶 = 𝛼1𝛽1 + √2𝑅2𝛽2                                                                                       (2b) 
(NC3): When 𝑅𝑖 < 12 𝛽𝑖 (𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖)2 holds ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2, in equilibrium we have:                                
 𝐴𝑖𝑁𝐶 = √2𝑅𝑖𝛽𝑖 ,  and  𝑋𝑖𝑁𝐶 = 0  ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2                                                    (3a) 
 𝐴𝑁𝐶 = 𝐴1𝑁𝐶 + 𝐴2𝑁𝐶 = √2𝑅1𝛽1 + √2𝑅2𝛽2                                                                                  (3b) 
We call the equilibrium (NC2) and (NC3) corner solution -- this is the case when at least one 
outfit is resource constrained. Given the above equilibria, we shall now study whether under 
cooperation, the outfits together will enhance terror activity.  
 
2.2 Co-operation between the terror outfits 
 
We assume that under cooperation, payoffs are freely transferable between outfits. This means 
that under cooperation, the outfits are concerned with the maximization of the sum of their 
payoffs, subject to the overall resource constraint. Hence, strategic cooperation is equivalent to a 
merger of the outfits. The outfits will cooperatively decide the numbers of attacks to be 
conducted through each of the two outfit channels. After this allocation, any resources left over 
will be consumed by the outfits. Note that the channel of consumption is irrelevant.  
 
As far as incentive for cooperation is concerned, it is true that in the present context there 
is no coordination or externality problem, nor is there an increase in cost efficiency though 
cooperation. Since the joint payoff under cooperation is always at least as large as the sum of 
their non-cooperative payoffs, this explains the incentive for cooperation. Moreover, if the 
ultimate objective of the terror activities is to overpower the targeted country and take a control, 
then the outfits are likely to promote increasing the number of total terror. We identify the 
situations when total number of attacks goes up under cooperation, and try to derive insights into 
the problem. 
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The optimization problem under cooperation is  
  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋1,𝑋2,𝐴1,𝐴2(𝑈1 + 𝑈2) = 𝑋 + 𝛼1𝐴1 + 𝛼2𝐴2                          
subject to the following constraints: 
Budget constraint:  𝑅1 + 𝑅2 = 𝑋 + 12 (𝛽1𝐴12 + 𝛽2𝐴22)                    
Non-negative constraints:    𝑋 ≥ 0,   𝐴1 ≥ 0 and 𝐴2 ≥ 0                
where 𝑋 = 𝑋1 + 𝑋2;  𝑋𝑖 ≥ 0 . Then the Lagrangian to the problem is given by:  max{𝑋,𝐴1,𝐴2 ,𝜆,𝜇,𝛾1,𝛾2 }  𝐿 
where 𝐿 = 𝑋 + 𝛼1𝐴1 + 𝛼2𝐴2 +  𝜆 [𝑅1 + 𝑅2 − 𝑋 − 12 (𝛽1𝐴12 + 𝛽2𝐴22)] + 𝜇𝑋 + 𝛾1 𝐴1 + 𝛾2 𝐴2 
By solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the above problem, we shall get the following 
characterization of equilibrium under cooperation (C) (see Appendix): 
 
(C1): If 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 ≥ 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2, the cooperative equilibrium outcome is 
 𝐴𝑖𝐶 = 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖, i=1, 2,  and 𝑋𝐶 = 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 − 12 (𝛼12𝛽1 + 𝛼22𝛽2) ≥ 0                                                   (4a) 
Then total number of attacks under this situation is 
 𝐴𝐶 = 𝐴1𝐶 + 𝐴2𝐶 = 𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2                                                                                                 (4b) 
 
(C2): If 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2, the cooperative equilibrium outcome is: 
 𝐴𝑖𝐶 = √2(𝑅𝑖+𝑅𝑗)𝛽𝑖𝛽𝑗𝛼𝑖2𝛽𝑗+𝛼𝑗2𝛽𝑖 (𝛼𝑖 𝛽𝑖 ),  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,  and 𝑋𝐶 = 0                                         (5a) 
 𝐴𝐶 = 𝐴1𝐶 + 𝐴2𝐶 = √2(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽1𝛽2𝛼12𝛽2+𝛼22𝛽1  [𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2]                                                                      (5b) 
 
2.3 Cooperative vs. Non-cooperative outcomes 
 
We are now in a position to examine whether under cooperation total number of attacks will go 
up compared to non-cooperative situation. We study this issue under four possible assumptions.  
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Assumption (A1): 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 ≥ 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2  along with 𝑅1 ≥ 12 𝛼12𝛽1 and 𝑅2 ≥ 12 𝛼22𝛽2 
 
Given assumption (A1), under non-cooperative equilibrium none of the outfits are resource 
constrained, hence the equilibrium outcome is given by (NC1). The corresponding equilibrium 
under cooperation is given by (C1). Then comparing (1) and (4) we have: 
 𝐴𝑖𝐶 = 𝐴𝑖𝑁𝐶; 𝑖 = 1, 2, and 𝐴𝐶 = 𝐴𝑁𝐶                                                                    
Therefore, when none of the outfits are resource constrained, cooperation will have no effect on 
the number of attacks. 
 
Proposition 1: When neither outfit is resource constrained, cooperation will have no impact on 
terror activity. 
 
Assumption (A2): 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 ≥ 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2  along with 𝑅1 > 12 𝛼12𝛽1 and 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼22𝛽2 
 
Under this assumption, the equilibrium under non-cooperative situation is given by (NC2). This 
is the scenario when only one outfit (here 𝑇2) is resource constrained under competition, but the 
outfit cooperation does not face any resource constraint, hence cooperative equilibrium continues 
to be given by (C1). So to see the effect of cooperation on the number of attacks, we compare (2) 
and (4). We have the results:  
 𝐴1𝐶 = 𝐴1𝑁𝐶, 𝐴2𝐶 > 𝐴2𝑁𝐶 and 𝐴𝐶 > 𝐴𝑁𝐶                                                                      
The inequality in the second term arises because 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼22𝛽2. Thus when only one outfit is resource 
constrained under non-cooperative competition, at least some surplus resource from the resource 
rich outfit (here 𝑇1) is funneled to conduct more attacks through resource constrained outfit 
channel (𝑇2), hence total number of attacks also goes up under cooperation. 
 
Proposition 2: When only one outfit is resource constrained while the other outfit has 
sufficiently large resources, cooperation enhances terror activity. 
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Assumption (A3): 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2  along with 𝑅1 ≥ 12 𝛼12𝛽1 and 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼22𝛽2 
 
Consider assumption (A3). This is the scenario when under non-cooperative competition outfit 𝑇2  is resource constrained (𝑇1 not), but the merged outfit faces a resource constraint in the sense 
that it cannot conduct as many attacks it wants. Hence, non-cooperative equilibrium is given by 
(NC2) while the cooperative equilibrium is given by (C2). Then comparing (2) and (5) we have 
the following results: First, since under this scenario, √2(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽1𝛽2𝛼12𝛽2+𝛼22𝛽1 < 1, so we must have 𝐴1𝐶 <𝐴1𝑁𝐶, that is, the number of attacks through unconstrained resource channel (𝑇1) will fall under 
cooperation. Further, under the given conditions we have 𝐴2𝐶 > 𝐴2𝑁𝐶. This follows from the fact 
that  
 √2(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽1𝛽2𝛼12𝛽2+𝛼22𝛽1  𝛼2𝛽2 > √2𝑅2𝛽2   ⟺ 𝑅1𝛼22𝛽1 >  𝑅2𝛼12𝛽2 ⟺ 𝑅112𝛼12𝛽1 > 𝑅212𝛼22𝛽2 
which holds, given (A3). Finally, total number of attacks will go up (i.e., 𝐴𝐶 > 𝐴𝑁𝐶) if and only 
if the following holds, that is, 
  √2(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽1𝛽2𝛼12𝛽2+𝛼22𝛽1  [𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2] > 𝛼1𝛽1 + √2𝑅2𝛽2                                                                               (6) 
We can therefore write the following result: 
 
Proposition 3: Under assumption (A3), cooperation between two outfits will enhance the total 
number of attacks if and only if the outfit which is resource-constrained a priori, is sufficiently 
small compared to the other outfit in terms of resources. 
 
Proof: We prove the result in a special case, when both the outfits are equally efficient at 
conducing attacks, and have the same intrinsic propensity for violence. Suppose 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼 
and 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽. Then the condition (6) reduces to 
 2 √(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽 > 𝛼𝛽 + √2𝑅2𝛽                                                                                                       (7) 
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Then there always exists (𝑅1, 𝑅2) satisfying 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 < 𝛼2𝛽   and 𝑅1 ≥ 12 𝛼2𝛽 > 𝑅2 such that the 
above inequality holds.10 This proves the result.  QED 
 
Proposition 3 must be understood in the context of transferring resources from the 
resource-abundant outfit (or channel of attack) to the resource-constrained outfit. In the vicinity 
of the initial equilibrium, this would leave the former’s attacks unchanged, while easing the 
latter’s resource-constraint and thereby enabling it to optimally conduct additional attacks. This 
would lead to higher overall attacks in the vicinity of the initial equilibrium. Further resource-
transfer in the same direction, however, is optimal under cooperation, as demonstrated earlier.11 
Beyond a point, such a transfer would cause the former outfit’s resource-constraint to bind, 
thereby causing its attacks to decline. However, this would be more (less) than proportionately 
compensated by the increase in the latter outfit’s attacks, if and only if the latter outfit is 
sufficiently (insufficiently) small compared to the former, because of diseconomies in 
conducting attacks driven by the convex cost functions. 
 
Assumption (A4): 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2  along with 𝑅1 < 12 𝛼12𝛽1 and 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼22𝛽2 
 
Finally, consider assumption (A4). This is the scenario when not only is the outfit cooperation as 
a whole resource constrained, but also both outfits are individually resource constrained a priori. 
Therefore, non-cooperative equilibrium is given by (NC3) and cooperative equilibrium by (C2). 
Hence comparing (3) and (5) we can see 
 𝐴𝑖𝐶 >< 𝐴𝑖𝑁𝐶  according as  𝑅𝑗𝛼𝑖2𝛽𝑗  ><  𝑅𝑖𝛼𝑗2𝛽𝑖,  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗                                                             (8)    
and  
 𝐴𝐶 >< 𝐴𝑁𝐶  according as  √2(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽1𝛽2𝛼12𝛽2+𝛼22𝛽1  [𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2] ><  √2𝑅1𝛽1 + √2𝑅2𝛽2                                      (9) 
Given the parametric restrictions under this case both the inequalities in (8) and (9) may go in 
either direction, this means in this case cooperation between the outfits may increase or decrease 
                                                          
10
 We can simply fix 𝑅1 + 𝑅2, then increase 𝑅1 and decrease 𝑅2 to satisfy the inequality (7). 
11
 Refer to the resource-allocation derived earlier, under the cooperative equilibrium given by (C2). 
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the number of attacks in each outfit channel as well as the total number of attacks. We check the 
results in the following special cases: 
 
Case (i): 𝛼1 = 𝛼2, 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 and 𝑅1 = 𝑅2. We expectedly obtain 𝐴𝑖𝐶 = 𝐴𝑖𝑁𝐶∀𝑖 = 1, 2, and 𝐴𝐶 =𝐴𝑁, that is, if the outfits are identical in respect of all parameters, cooperation will have no effect. 
Since both the outfits are identical in every respect, there is nothing additional to share under 
cooperation. 
 
Case (ii): 𝛼1 = 𝛼2, 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 but 𝑅1 ≠ 𝑅2. Here, we get 𝐴𝐶 > 𝐴𝑁.12 Without any loss of 
generality, suppose 𝑅1 > 𝑅2. Then 𝐴1𝐶 < 𝐴1𝑁𝐶 and 𝐴2𝐶 > 𝐴2𝑁𝐶. So when the outfits differ only in 
respect of the size of their resources, cooperation will lead to a higher number of total attacks, 
such that the number of attacks through the outfit channel which has lesser resources will go up. 
The result is intuitive. Since 𝑅1 > 𝑅2, therefore under non-cooperation, 𝐴1𝑁𝐶 > 𝐴2𝑁𝐶. Now given 
that the cost of conducting attacks is increasing and convex, the marginal cost of attacking 
through 𝑇1 under non-cooperative competition is larger than 𝑇2. Hence, under cooperation, 
reallocation of resources from channel 𝑇𝑖 to channel 𝑇𝑗 will be mutually rewarding, that is, 𝐴𝑖 
will fall and 𝐴𝑗 will rise. Reducing one unit of 𝐴𝑖 will release resources for conducting more than 
one unit of 𝐴𝑗. Therefore, the total number of attacks (A) will go up.  
 
Case (iii): 𝛽1 = 𝛽2, 𝑅1 = 𝑅2 but 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2. Here, we obtain 𝐴𝐶 < 𝐴𝑁𝐶.13 If 𝛼1 > 𝛼2, then we get 
have 𝐴1𝐶 > 𝐴1𝑁𝐶 and 𝐴2𝐶 < 𝐴2𝑁𝐶, that is, the number of attacks through the outfit channel having a 
higher intrinsic propensity of violence goes up and that through the other channel falls. The total 
number of attacks also falls, given that the outfits differ in respect of their violence propensities. 
The intuition of this result also hinges on cost-convexities. Because the attacks conducted by 
each outfit in the non-cooperative equilibrium are equal and independent of the intrinsic 
propensity of violence, resource reallocation from one outfit to the other leads to efficiency loss 
at the margin, due to the increasing and strictly convex cost of conducting attacks. But given 
                                                          
12
 Under Case (ii), 𝐴𝐶 = 2 √(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽  and 𝐴𝑁𝐶 = √2𝑅1𝛽 + √2𝑅2𝛽 .  Therefore, 𝐴𝐶 > 𝐴𝑁 because (𝑅1+𝑅2)2 > √𝑅1𝑅2 , that 
is, 𝐴. 𝑀. > 𝐺. 𝑀. 
13
 Under Case (iii), 𝐴𝐶 = 2 √2𝑅𝛽 (𝛼1+𝛼2)√2(𝛼12+𝛼22)  and 𝐴𝑁𝐶 = 2 √2𝑅𝛽 . Hence, 𝐴𝐶 < 𝐴𝑁𝐶  because (𝛼1+𝛼2)√2(𝛼12+𝛼22) < 1. 
14 
 
𝛼1 > 𝛼2, since resources are drawn from outfit channel 𝑇2 to conduct additional attack through 𝑇1, payoff of the outfit cooperation will increase at the margin. This explains why the number of 
attacks through 𝑇1 will go up, while that through 𝑇2 will fall. But given the strictly convex cost 
function, the fall of attacks in equilibrium must dominate the increase, thereby leading to a lower 
total number of attacks under cooperation.  
Case (iv): 𝛼1 = 𝛼2, 𝑅1 = 𝑅2 but 𝛽1 ≠ 𝛽2. Here we unambiguously obtain 𝐴𝐶 > 𝐴𝑁, that is, 
cooperation will enhance the total number of  attacks.14 Without any loss of generality when 𝛽1 > 𝛽2, we get 𝐴1𝐶 < 𝐴1𝑁𝐶 and 𝐴2𝐶 > 𝐴2𝑁𝐶, implying that the inefficient outfit channel will 
conduct less attacks under cooperation. Since more and more attacks are conducted through 
efficient channel, the total number of attacks will go up. 
 
Summarizing the above results, we arrive at the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: When both outfits are resource constrained a priori, and the outfits differ in 
respect of at least one parameter, cooperation will affect the number of attacks to be conducted 
by each outfit as well as the total number of attacks. In particular, if the outfits have different 
levels of resources or if they differ in respect of their efficiency in conducting attacks, the total 
number of attacks under cooperation must increase. On the other hand, if the outfits have 
different intrinsic propensities of violence, cooperation will reduce the total number of attacks. 
 
3. Cooperation under Sponsorship 
 
There are evidences to show that terror outfits sometimes receive funds from different agencies 
such as charities and NGOs.15 A part of this sponsorship is provided strategically, to induce more 
attacks. 
 
Consider the availability of external sponsorship 𝐹 > 0 (measured in units of the 
consumption). Further, assume that the sponsor commits this fund to be distributed ex post 
                                                          
14
 Here 𝐴𝐶 =  √ 2𝑅𝛽𝑖𝛽𝑗 √2(𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗)  and 𝐴𝑁 =  √ 2𝑅𝛽𝑖𝛽𝑗 (√𝛽𝑖 + √𝛽𝑗), hence 𝐴𝐶 > 𝐴𝑁𝐶  because 𝐴. 𝑀. > 𝐺. 𝑀. 
15
 See Chadha (2015) for a comprehensive discussion on the sources of terror finance. 
15 
 
between the outfits in proportion to the number of terror attacks conducted by each.16 Thus, 𝑇𝑖 
receives 𝐹𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖𝐴𝑖+𝐴𝑗 𝐹. In the presence of such sponsorship, the payoff function of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ terrorist 
group (𝑖 = 1, 2) becomes 
  𝑈𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝐴𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖                                                                                                        (10) 
After incorporating the budget constraint, the payoff maximization problem of 𝑇𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2) 
becomes 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑖𝑈𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖 − 12 𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑖2 + 𝛼𝑖𝐴𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖                                                                               (11) 
Let the equilibrium solution of terror attacks to the problem under non-cooperation be (𝐴1∗ , 𝐴2∗ ). 
It is shown in Bhan and Kabiraj (2020), that the equilibrium is stable and unique. Further, when 
resources are sufficiently large (i.e., 𝑅𝑖 > 12 𝛼𝑖2𝛽𝑖 ; 𝑖 = 1, 2 ), the reaction functions are initially 
upward sloping, intersect the 450-line, and then slope downwards.17 It is hence possible that the 
number of attacks under sponsorship can be larger, compared to the case of no sponsorship. This 
illustrates the possibility that external sponsorship can induce more attacks when the outfits 
compete non-cooperatively. 
 
Now suppose that given the commitment of the sponsors, the outfits decide to act 
cooperatively and hence maximize the sum of their payoffs. Hence the problem is: 
         𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋1,𝑋2,𝐴1,𝐴2(𝑈1 + 𝑈2) = 𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + 𝛼1𝐴1 + 𝛼2𝐴2 + 𝐹                (12)                    
subject to the budget constraint, 
                        𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + 12 (𝛽1𝐴12 + 𝛽2𝐴22) = 𝑅1 + 𝑅2                                        
One can see that if 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 ≥ 12 (𝛼12𝛽1 + 𝛼22𝛽2), then an interior optimum exists. Otherwise, there is a 
corner solution. In either case, the solution to the above optimization problem is independent of 𝐹 and is identical to the solution to the optimization problem of subsection 2.2 (absence of 
sponsorship). We therefore arrive at Proposition 5. 
 
                                                          
16
 This is called the proportionate external sponsorship rule or mechanism (Bhan and Kabiraj, 2020). 
17
 The slope of 𝑇𝑖’s reaction function is 𝑑𝐴𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑗 = − 𝜕2𝑈𝑖𝜕𝐴𝑖𝜕𝐴𝑗𝜕2𝑈𝑖𝜕𝐴𝑖2 = (𝐴𝑖−𝐴𝑗)𝐹𝛽𝑖(𝐴𝑖+𝐴𝑗)3+2𝐴𝑗𝐹 (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 = 1,2), which  is positive or 
negative according as 𝐴𝑖 > 𝐴𝑗 or 𝐴𝑖 < 𝐴𝑗. 
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Proposition 5: If the terror outfits co-operate in the presence of proportionate external 
sponsorship, then the number of terror strikes conducted by each group will be identical to that 
in the absence of external sponsorship. 
 
The intuition for this result rests on the fact that external sponsorship loses its ability to 
induce terror strikes because, irrespective of the values of 𝐴1 and 𝐴2, the groups together would 
receive 𝐹1 + 𝐹2 = 𝐹. Hence, the number of terror strikes each outfit conducts will depend only 
on those factors which determine the equilibrium levels in the absence of external sponsorship, 
thereby ensuring a solution identical to that in the absence of external sponsorship. The 
following is, therefore, a straight-forward corollary: 
 
Corollary: If terror outfits strategically co-operate, there is no incentive for proportionate 
external sponsorship. 
 
It seems intuitive that in an environment characterized by the presence of multiple terror 
outfits and a common potential external sponsor, greater strategic cooperation between the terror 
outfits would impede the ability of the sponsor to manipulate the behavior of the outfits. This, in 
turn, would weaken the incentive for the external sponsor to provide sponsorship. The sponsor 
would therefore have an incentive to hinder strategic co-operation or engineer a split between the 
terror outfits, in order to increase its own influence on their actions. This is allegedly what 
happened in the case of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) in 1998, as discussed earlier. 
 
4. Further Extension 
 
Since the joint payoff of the outfits under cooperation is never less than the sum of their non-
cooperative payoffs, the outfits may optimally cooperate if possible, irrespective of whether any 
sponsorship (under the proportional allocation rule) is available or not. Then, from the above 
analysis, it follows that the total number of terror attacks will equal that under non-cooperative 
competition. On the other hand, we have seen that when sponsorship is unavailable, cooperation 
can increase the total number of terror attacks compared to non-cooperation. This implies that 
there will be no incentive for providing proportionate external sponsorship, since cooperation is 
17 
 
never less beneficial than non-cooperation, from the perspective of the outfits. Hence, our model 
thus far, fails to rationalize proportionate external sponsorship.  In the analysis below, we 
slightly modify the structure of the game, and demonstrate how sponsorship money may 
strategically be chosen to increase the number of attacks.  
  
Suppose that in the beginning, an external sponsor commits to pay 𝐹 > 0 if and only if 
the outfits play a non-cooperative game to determine the levels of their terror activities. In the 
following analysis, we shall call this regime 𝐹. If they  do not provide any sponsorship (i.e., 𝐹 =0) however, and then the outfits decide optimally whether to play the game cooperatively or non-
cooperatively, we shall call this regime ∅. As we have shown earlier, under this situation the 
outfits will play cooperatively. Then 𝐹 > 0 will be committed if and only if 𝐴𝑁𝐶(𝐹) > 𝐴𝐶(∅), 
that is, total number of terror attacks under 𝐹 regime is larger than that under ∅ regime. But such 
an offer will be acceptable to the outfits if and only if 𝑈𝑁𝐶(𝐹) ≥ 𝑈𝐶(∅), where 𝑈(.) = 𝑈1(.) +𝑈2(.), that is, outfits are not worse off by accepting the 𝐹 contract. We shall discuss the problem 
under different scenarios.   
 
Scenario (1): First consider the case where 𝑅𝑖 > 12 𝛼𝑖2𝛽𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, 2), so that 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 > 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2. 
This is (part of) Assumption (A1). From sub-section 2.3, we have 𝐴𝐶(∅) = 𝐴𝑁𝐶(∅) = 𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2, 
i.e., when 𝐹 = 0, while cooperation is weekly preferred to non-cooperation by the outfits, it does 
not increase the number of attacks. On the other hand, when 𝐹 > 0 is offered, it will be accepted 
by the outfits because  𝑈𝑁𝐶(𝐹) > 𝑈𝑁𝐶(∅) = 𝑈𝐶(∅), and given the assumption we must have 𝐴𝑁𝐶(𝐹) > 𝐴𝐶(∅), because 𝐴𝑖𝑁𝐶(𝐹) > 𝐴𝑖𝐶(∅); 𝑖 = 1, 2. Therefore, under this case, sponsorship 
will occur and the number of attacks will go up. Since the maximum number of attacks that 𝑇1 
and 𝑇2 can conduct cannot exceed √2𝑅1𝛽1  and √2𝑅2𝛽2  respectively, sponsors together can choose 𝐹 
strategically such that the outfits conduct these numbers of terror activities.18 
                                                          
18
 So long as 𝐴𝑖 ≤ √2𝑅𝑖𝛽𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, for any 𝐹 > 0, 𝐴𝑖’s are solved from the FOCs of utility maximization problem 
under non-cooperative situation, i.e., 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐴𝑗(𝐴𝑖+𝐴𝑗)2 𝐹 − 𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑖 = 0; 𝑖 = 1, 2. Now setting 𝐴𝑖 = √2𝑅𝑖𝛽𝑖  for 𝑖 = 1, 2, from 
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Scenario (2): Next, let us consider the case when 𝑅1 < 12 𝛼12𝛽1 and 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼22𝛽2 so that 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 <12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2. This is Assumption (A4). In this case under ∅ regime cooperation between the outfits 
will take place, and we have shown in subsection 2.3 that there are situations when cooperation 
will increase the number of attacks.19 But given the assumption, sponsorship money cannot 
increase the number of total attacks, because under 𝐹, total number of attacks under non-
cooperative situation will be stuck at √2𝑅1𝛽1 + √2𝑅2𝛽2 . Hence sponsorship money in this case will 
not induce more attacks.20  
 
Scenario (3): Now consider assumption (A2), i.e., 𝑅1 > 12 𝛼12𝛽2 and 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼22𝛽2 but 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 ≥ 12 𝛼12𝛽1 +12 𝛼22𝛽2. This appears to be the most interesting case. We have already derived (in Subsection 2.1 
and 2.2) that [𝐴1𝑁𝐶(∅) = 𝛼1𝛽1, 𝐴2𝑁𝐶(∅) = √2𝑅2𝛽2 < 𝛼2𝛽2] and [𝐴1𝐶(∅) = 𝛼1𝛽1, 𝐴2𝐶(∅) = 𝛼2𝛽2] so that 𝐴𝐶(∅) > 𝐴𝑁(∅). Therefore, when no sponsorship is available, the outfits will choose their terror 
activities cooperatively, and the number of attacks is larger than that under non-cooperative 
situation. Hence under ∅, 𝐴𝐶(∅) = 𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2. Correspondingly, the joint profits of the outfits are, 
 𝑈𝐶(∅) = 𝛼1 (𝛼1𝛽1) + 𝛼2 (𝛼2𝛽2) + 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 − 12 (𝛼12𝛽1 + 𝛼22𝛽2) = 12 [𝛼12𝛽1 + 𝛼22𝛽2] + 𝑅1 + 𝑅2           (13) 
Then question is whether by committing an appropriate amount of funding, conditional on the 
terror outfits playing the game non-cooperatively, the sponsor can induce the outfits to further 
increase the total number of attacks. We show that if 𝑅1 is sufficiently large, the sponsors can 
appropriately choose an 𝐹 > 0 to maximize the number of total attacks.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the FOCs we shall get the optimal level of sponsorship fund maximizing the total number of attacks to be  𝐹 =(𝛽1𝐴1 + 𝛽2𝐴2) − (𝛽1 + 𝛽2). 
19
 𝐴𝐶(∅) > 𝐴𝑁𝐶(∅) iff √2(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽1𝛽2𝛼12𝛽2+𝛼22𝛽1  [𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2] > √2𝑅1𝛽1 + √2𝑅2𝛽2 . 
20
 In this situation we may, however, think that sponsors pay each outfit some money to supplement its initial 
resource before any attack takes place. For example, 𝑇𝑖  will increase its terror attacks from √2𝑅𝑖𝛽𝑖  to 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖 if it gets an 
amount of fund 𝐹𝑖 where √2𝑅𝑖+𝐹𝑖𝛽𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖. 
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 If any 𝐹 > 0 is offered by the sponsors and accepted by the terror outfits, then given 
Assumption (A2), the optimal number of terror attacks chosen by 𝑇2 will be 𝐴2𝑁𝐶(𝑅2 ) = √2𝑅2𝛽2 , 
and the optimal number of terror attacks to be chosen by 𝑇1 will be  
   𝐴1𝑁𝐶(𝐹; 𝑅1, 𝑅2) = min{𝐴1(𝐹; 𝐴2𝑁𝐶(𝑅2 )), √2𝑅1𝛽1  }                                                          (14)     
where 𝐴1(𝐹; 𝐴2𝑁𝐶(𝑅2 )) is the solution obtained from the FOC of the problem: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐴1𝑈1 = 𝑅1 −12 𝛽1𝐴12 + 𝛼1𝐴1 + 𝐹1, where 𝐹1 = 𝐴2𝐴1+𝐴2 𝐹 and 𝐴2 = 𝐴2𝑁𝐶(𝑅2 ). The FOC is: 
 𝛼1 + 𝐴2(𝐴1+𝐴2)2 𝐹 − 𝛽1𝐴1 = 0                                                                                            (15) 
Given that the SOC is satisfied, 𝐴1(𝐹; 𝐴2𝑁𝐶(𝑅2 )) is solved from the above. Now, as long as 𝐴1(𝐹; 𝐴2𝑁𝐶(𝑅2 )) < √2𝑅1𝛽1 , 𝐹 can be increased to increase 𝐴1𝑁𝐶(. ) up to √2𝑅1𝛽1 . Hence, the optimal 𝐹 maximizing the total number of attacks under this situation is given by 𝐹∗ = 𝐹(𝑅1;  𝑅2), 
solved from 𝐴1𝑁𝐶(𝐹; 𝑅1, 𝑅2) = √2𝑅1𝛽1 .21 Therefore, 𝐹(𝑅1;  𝑅2) will be offered by the sponsors 
provided the total number of terror attacks under 𝐹 > 0 (non-cooperative competition) is larger 
than that under 𝐹 = 0 (cooperative situation), i.e., 𝐴𝑁𝐶(𝐹) > 𝐴𝐶(∅), or, √2𝑅1𝛽1 + √2𝑅2𝛽2  ≥ 𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2, 
and hence 
  𝑅1 > 𝛽12  [ 𝛼1 𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2 − √2𝑅2𝛽2  ]2 ≡ 𝑅1∗                                                                                 (16) 
Now given 𝑅1 > 𝑅1∗, thus when sponsors want to induce terror attacks (𝐴1𝑁𝐶 , 𝐴2𝑁𝐶), the optimal 
sponsor money 𝐹(𝑅1;  𝑅2) is solved from the FOC 𝛼1 + 𝐴2(𝐴1+𝐴2)2 𝐹 − 𝛽1𝐴1 = 0, i.e.,  
 𝐹(𝑅1;  𝑅2) = (𝛽1𝐴1 − 𝛼1) (𝐴1+𝐴2)2𝐴2                                                                                  (17)     
 
 Finally, given 𝑅1 > 𝑅1∗, offer 𝐹(𝑅1;  𝑅2) will be acceptable to the outfits if and only if 𝑈𝑁𝐶(𝐹) ≥ 𝑈𝐶(∅), we have 
     𝑈𝑁𝐶(𝐹) = 𝛼1(𝐴1𝑁𝐶) + 𝛼2(𝐴2𝑁𝐶) + 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 − 12 𝛽1(𝐴1𝑁𝐶)2 − 12 𝛽2(𝐴2𝑁𝐶)2 + 𝐹 
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 For all 𝐹 ≥  𝐹(𝑅1, 𝑅2), 𝐴1𝑁𝐶 will remain fixed at√2𝑅1𝛽1  . 
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                   = 𝛼1 (√2𝑅1𝛽1 ) + 𝛼2 (√2𝑅2𝛽2 ) + 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 − 12 [𝛽1 (√2𝑅1𝛽1 )2 + 𝛽2 (√2𝑅2𝛽2 )2 + 𝐹(𝑅1;  𝑅2) 
Hence,  
 𝑈𝑁𝐶(𝐹) = 𝛼1 (√2𝑅1𝛽1 ) + 𝛼2 (√2𝑅2𝛽2 ) + 𝐹(𝑅1;  𝑅2)                                                      (18) 
Therefore, 𝑈𝑁𝐶(𝐹)) ≥ 𝑈𝐶(∅) if and only if (comparing (13) and (18)), 
 𝛼1 [(√2𝑅1𝛽1 ) − 12 (𝛼1𝛽1)] + 𝐹(𝑅1;  𝑅2) ≥ 𝛼2[12  (𝛼2𝛽2) − √2𝑅2𝛽2 ]                                              (19) 
The LHS is strictly positive, but the RHS can be positive or negative or zero. Hence the 
sufficient condition that the above condition will always be satisfied is 𝛼2𝛽2 ≤ 2√2𝑅2𝛽2 , that is, 𝑅2 is 
sufficiently small. In general, condition (19) will be satisfied if 𝑅1 is sufficiently large. 
 
Scenario (4): Now consider scenario where 𝑅1 > 12 𝛼12𝛽1 and 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼22𝛽2 , but 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 < 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2. 
In this case  𝐴𝐶(∅) = √2(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽1𝛽2𝛼12𝛽2+𝛼22𝛽1  [𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2] < 𝛼1𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2  because √2(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽1𝛽2𝛼12𝛽2+𝛼22𝛽1 < 1. The 
analysis in this case will be similar to the previous case. Here however we have the limited 
flexibility to increase 𝑅1 to satisfy the similar condition like (16).22 
 
 To summarize this subsection, we see that there are scenarios where the sponsors can 
choose the sponsorship money and contracts appropriately such that sponsorship will lead to a 
higher terrorist activity. All that matters in this case is the amount of resources the outfits have 
access to, initially. Hence we can write the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 6: The provision of external sponsorship, utilizing an appropriate sponsorship 
mechanism, always enhances terror activity.  
  
5. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
22
  Here, 𝑅1 > 𝛽12  [ 2(𝑅1+𝑅2)𝛽1𝛽2𝛼12𝛽2+𝛼22𝛽1 (𝛼1 𝛽1 + 𝛼2𝛽2) − √2𝑅2𝛽2  ]2 ≡ 𝑅1∗∗. 
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In the present paper we have shown that when the terror outfits differ in respect of one or the 
other characteristic, there are situations when the outfits might gain by cooperating by means of 
resource relocation between themselves, and thereby increasing the number of total attacks. 
Generally, outfits prefer to work independently so as to preserve their identities and autonomy. 
But there are evidences to show that sometimes the outfits go for strategic cooperation to achieve 
their broader goal. Particularly, when outfits are not too distant ideologically, they may be 
willing to coordinate their activities, appropriately transfer resources and terror technology, 
enhance the number of attacks, and thereby reap benefits by exploiting loopholes in the state’s 
security apparatus. 
 
We have shown in the paper that benefits of strategic cooperation accrue to the 
cooperating outfits, when at least one outfit is resource constrained. Through cooperation, the 
outfits can reallocate resources to conduct attacks more efficiently, or in favor of more 
aggressive outlet. Inter-outfit cooperation can also derive benefits from cost-convexities.  
Contrarily, if there are sponsors who commit to provide fund to the outfits in proportion to their 
attacks, then cooperation will reduce total number of attacks compared to the non-cooperative 
situation. This implies that in such a situation, no strategic external sponsor will commit any 
funds to the outfits. We have, however, subsequently modified the game and demonstrated 
situations justifying the existence of external sponsorship. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide insights to policy makers, to enable better 
designing the counter-terrorism (CT) policies. Defensive CT policies generally increase the cost 
of terrorist operations. The present work underscores the importance of preventing the transfer of 
resources and other terror materials, from one outfit to the other. In such scenarios, offensive 
policies that target to destroy infrastructure or confiscate terror resources, may appear very 
effective. However, such a policy may sometimes be very expensive to implement, both in 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary terms. Confidence building measures, that target one or the other 
outfit to restore normalcy, may not be very effective in view of the possible funneling of 
resources from one outfit to the other. 
Finally, and more generally, our analysis demonstrates that inter-outfit strategic 
cooperation can serve to increase terror attacks in certain circumstances, while serving to inhibit 
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terror activity under other situations. An example of the former is when a resource-constrained 
outfit cooperates with a resource-abundant outfit having sufficiently large resources, in the 
absence of external funding. On the other hand, we have discussed multiple situations where 
external sponsorship can be offered strategically to enhance terror activity by inhibiting inter-
group cooperation. Therefore, CT efforts targeted at disrupting cooperation under the former set 
of circumstances, while those aimed at curbing the leverage of the external sponsor over the 
terrorists by encouraging intergroup cooperation under the latter, would serve to decrease terror 
attacks. The present work, therefore, calls for reviewing the existing CT policy framework in 
view of the implications of strategic cooperation between terror outfits. 
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Appendix 
 
The Lagrangian problem is given by:  max{𝑋,𝐴1,𝐴2 ,𝜆,𝜇,𝛾1,𝛾2 }  𝐿 
where  𝐿 = 𝑋 + 𝛼1𝐴1 + 𝛼2𝐴2 +  𝜆 [𝑅1 + 𝑅2 − 𝑋 − 12 (𝛽1𝐴12 + 𝛽2𝐴22)] + 𝜇𝑋 + 𝛾1 𝐴1 + 𝛾2 𝐴2 
The relevant K-T conditions for solving the above problem are: 
(i) 𝜕𝐿𝜕𝑋 = 1 −  𝜆 + 𝜇 = 0               
(ii) 𝜕𝐿𝜕𝐴𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 −  𝜆𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 = 0; 𝑖 = 1, 2     
(iii) 𝜆 ≥ 0, 𝜇 ≥ 0, 𝛾𝑖 ≥ 0 (𝑖 = 1, 2)   
(iv) 𝑋 ≥ 0,  𝐴𝑖 ≥ 0 (𝑖 = 1, 2),   𝑅1 + 𝑅2 ≥ 𝑋 + 12 (𝛽1𝐴12 + 𝛽2𝐴22) 
(v) 𝜇𝑋 = 0, 𝛾𝑖 𝐴𝑖 = 0 (𝑖 = 1, 2)  and 𝜆 [𝑅𝑖 + 𝑅𝑗 − 𝑋 − 12 (𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑖2 + 𝛽𝑗𝐴𝑗2)] = 0 
In our formulation, 𝐴𝑖 > 0, and so 𝛾𝑖 = 0 ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2 (from (v)).  Now consider the following 
cases: 
 
Case (a): Consider equilibrium with 𝑋 > 0 ; this means 𝜇 = 0 (see (v)), hence  𝜆 = 1 (from (i)). 
This leads to cooperative equilibrium (from (ii)): 
 𝐴𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖 ≡ 𝐴𝑖𝐶  ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2  with 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 > 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2. 
 
Case (b): Consider equilibrium with 𝑋 = 0. This means 𝜇 ≥ 0, and hence 𝜆 = 1 + 𝜇 ≥ 1 (see 
(v) and (i)). When 𝜇 = 0, 𝜆 = 1, and the cooperative equilibrium is given by 
 𝐴𝑖𝐶 = 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖  ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2  and 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 = 12 𝛼12𝛽1 + 12 𝛼22𝛽2. 
If 𝜇 > 0, then 𝜆 > 1. Hence, 𝐴𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝜆𝛽𝑖 < 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖  ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2 from (ii), and   𝑅1 + 𝑅2 = 12 (𝛽1𝐴12 + 𝛽2𝐴22) (from (iv)). Then plugging the values of 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 into this 
expression, we get: 
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1 𝜆2 = 2(𝑅𝑖+𝑅𝑗)𝛽𝑖𝛽𝑗𝛼𝑖2𝛽𝑗+𝛼𝑗2𝛽𝑖  
Therefore, we get the cooperative solution 
 𝐴𝑖𝐶 = √2(𝑅𝑖+𝑅𝑗)𝛽𝑖𝛽𝑗𝛼𝑖2𝛽𝑗+𝛼𝑗2𝛽𝑖 . 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖  for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗    
This solves the cooperative game. 
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